hot white monkey sex (fwd)

rosaphil (
Sat, 15 May 1999 16:12:16 -0400 (EDT)

to all my friends who may have their net access limited bigtime.

here is a treat.

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*Better Living Thru Better Living!* *

13 May 1999. A source for a list of "MI6 officers" has been provided: No authentication, may be genuine, a folly or
a black op. 
13 May 1999. Birdie says that it is another, yet unidentified, US Web site
which published 100+ names of MI6 officers. The site is said to be now
inactive. A press report on it should be appearing in Europe later today.
That's all we know until birdie dumps more. 

12 May 1999

The source URL disappeared on May 12, 1999, at about 5:00 PM US-CST. A.
has provided a TAR.Z compressed file of the complete site: (79K). 

Richard Tomlinson has written us today that there was never any names or
information on his site that was not public information, and that HMG is
overreacting for public effect to stigmatize his efforts. The names of MI6
officers cited in his affidavit on MI6 and Princess Diana below: 

Nicholas John Andrew LANGMAN 
Richard David SPEARMAN 

Chief of MI6 David SPEDDING 

Nicholas Bernard Frank FISHWICK 





Chief of MI6 Colin McCOLL 

These names, and another, Andrew Fulton, were previously publicized:!milosev.htm (mirrored here) 


 [Java script and link buttons removed; for original file see] 

Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v
Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v
Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v


  Directory of MI6 Officers 

The first step to bringing accountability to MI6 is to publish the names
of their officers. Every other branch of British public service publishes
an annual directory of their officers. The Army has the Army list, the
Police the Constabulary list etc. But MI6 publishes no such list. Why?
Because they do not want their officers to be held accountable for their

MI6 whine that the publication of such a list would "endanger the lives of
agents". This is a smokescreen. Any member of the UK armed forces or the
police faces far greater physical danger in the course of his normal duty
than an MI6 officer, yet their names are published because they are
legally accountable. So why not MI6 too? 

Below is a partial list. It is not yet complete, but further names will be
added as they are researched. 

INJUNCTED!!  - MI6 obtain another injunction - read below! 

[Two images of injunction were not accessible] 

 [No names provided] 


For More Information Contact:

Richard Tomlinson 

Last modified: May 11, 1999  


MI6 and the Princess of Wales 

Attached below is a sworn and testified statement that I have made on 12th
May 1999 to the enquiry into the deaths of the Princess of Wales, Dodi Al
Fayed, and Henri Paul. I firmly believe that MI6 have information in their
files that would assist Judge Stephan's enquiry. Why don't they yield up
this information? They should not be entitled to use the Official Secrets
Act to protect themselves from investigation into the deaths of three
people, particularly in the case of an incident of this magnitude and
historical importance. 


I, Richard John Charles Tomlinson, former MI6 officer, of Geneva,
Switzerland hereby declare: 

I firmly believe that there exist documents held by the British Secret
Intelligence Service (MI6) that would yield important new evidence into
the cause and circumstances leading to the deaths of the Princess of
Wales, Mr Dodi Al Fayed, and M. Henri Paul in Paris in August 1997. 
I was employed by MI6 between September 1991 and April 1995. During that
time, I saw various documents that I believe would provide new evidence
and new leads into the investigation into these deaths. I also heard
various rumours  which though I was not able to see supporting documents
I am confident were based on solid fact. 
In 1992, I was working in the Eastern European Controllerate of MI6 and I
was peripherally involved in a large and complicated operation to smuggle
advanced Soviet weaponry out of the then disintegrating and disorganised
remnants of the Soviet Union. During 1992, I spent several days reading
the substantial files on this operation. These files contain a wide
miscellany of contact notes, telegrams, intelligence reports, photographs
etc, from which it was possible to build up a detailed understanding of
the operation. The operation involved a large cast of officers and agents
of MI6. One more than one occasion, meetings between various figures in
the operation took place at the Ritz Hotel, Place de Vendome, Paris. There
were in the file several intelligence reports on these meetings, which had
been written by one of the MI6 officers based in Paris at the time
(identified in the file only by a coded designation). The source of the
information was an informant in the Ritz Hotel, who again was identified
in the files only by a code number. The MI6 officer paid the informant in
cash for his information. I became curious to learn more about the
identity of this particular informant, because his number cropped up
several times and he seemed to have extremely good access to the goings on
in the Ritz Hotel. I therefore ordered this informants personal file from
MI6s central file registry. When I read this new file, I was not at all
surprised to learn that the informant was a security officer of the Ritz
Hotel. Intelligence services always target the security officers of
important hotels because they have such good access to intelligence. I
remember, however, being mildly surprised that the nationality of this
informant was French, and this stuck in my memory, because it is rare that
MI6 succeeds in recruiting a French informer. I cannot claim that I
remember from this reading of the file that the name of this person was
Henri Paul, but I have no doubt with the benefit of hindsight that this
was he. Although I did not subsequently come across Henri Paul again
during my time in MI6, I am confident that the relationship between he and
MI6 would have continued until his death, because MI6 would never
willingly relinquish control over such a well placed informant. I am sure
that the personal file of Henri Paul will therefore contain notes of
meetings between him and his MI6 controlling officer right up until the
point of his death. I firmly believe that these files will contain
evidence of crucial importance to the circumstances and causes of the
incident that killed M. Paul, together with the Princess of Wales and Dodi
Al Fayed. 
The most senior undeclared officer in the local MI6 station would normally
control an informant of M.Pauls usefulness and seniority. Officers
declared to the local counter-intelligence service (in this case the
Directorate de Surveillance Territoire, or DST) would not be used to
control such an informant, because it might lead to the identity of the
informant becoming known to the local intelligence services. In Paris at
the time of M. Pauls death, there were two relatively experienced but
undeclared MI6 officers. The first was Mr Nicholas John Andrew LANGMAN,
born 1960. The second was Mr Richard David SPEARMAN, again born in 1960. I
firmly believe that either one or both of these officers will be well
acquainted with M Paul, and most probably also met M. Paul shortly before
his death. I believe that either or both of these officers will have
knowledge that will be of crucial importance in establishing the sequence
of events leading up to the deaths of M.Paul, Dodi Al Fayed and the
Princess of Wales. Mr Spearman in particular was an extremely well
connected and influential officer, because he had been, prior to his
appointment in Paris, the personal secretary to the Chief of MI6 Mr David
SPEDDING. As such, he would have been privy to even the most confidential
of MI6 operations. I believe that there may well be significance in the
fact that Mr Spearman was posted to Paris in the month immediately before
the deaths. 
Later in 1992, as the civil war in the former Yugoslavia became
increasingly topical, I started to work primarily on operations in Serbia.
During this time, I became acquainted with Dr Nicholas Bernard Frank
FISHWICK, born 1958, the MI6 officer who at the time was in charge of
planning Balkan operations. During one meeting with Dr Fishwick, he
casually showed to me a three-page document that on closer inspection
turned out to be an outline plan to assassinate the Serbian leader
President Slobodan Milosevic. The plan was fully typed, and attached to a
yellow "minute board", signifying that this was a formal and accountable
document. It will therefore still be in existence. Fishwick had annotated
that the document be circulated to the following senior MI6 officers:
Maurice KENDWRICK-PIERCEY, then head of Balkan operations, John RIDDE,
then the security officer for Balkan operations, the SAS liaison officer
to MI6 (designation MODA/SO, but I have forgotten his name), the head of
the Eastern European Controllerate (then Richard FLETCHER) and finally
Alan PETTY, the personal secretary to the then Chief of MI6, Colin McCOLL.
This plan contained a political justification for the assassination of
Milosevic, followed by three outline proposals on how to achieve this
objective. I firmly believe that the third of these scenarios contained
information that could be useful in establishing the causes of death of
Henri Paul, the Princess of Wales, and Dodi Al Fayed. This third scenario
suggested that Milosevic could be assassinated by causing his personal
limousine to crash. Dr Fishwick proposed to arrange the crash in a tunnel,
because the proximity of concrete close to the road would ensure that the
crash would be sufficiently violent to cause death or serious injury, and
would also reduce the possibility that there might be independent, casual
witnesses. Dr Fishwick suggested that one way to cause the crash might be
to disorientate the chauffeur using a strobe flash gun, a device which is
occasionally deployed by special forces to, for example, disorientate
helicopter pilots or terrorists, and about which MI6 officers are briefed
about during their training. In short, this scenario bore remarkable
similarities to the circumstances and witness accounts of the crash that
killed the Princess of Wales, Dodi Al Fayed, and Henri Paul. I firmly
believe that this document should be yielded by MI6 to the Judge
investigating these deaths, and would provide further leads that he could
During my service in MI6, I also learnt unofficially and second-hand
something of the links between MI6 and the Royal Household. MI6 are
frequently and routinely asked by the Royal Household (usually via the
Foreign Office) to provide intelligence on potential threats to members of
the Royal Family whilst on overseas trips. This service would frequently
extend to asking friendly intelligence services (such as the CIA) to place
members of the Royal Family under discrete surveillance, ostensibly for
their own protection. This was particularly the case for the Princess of
Wales, who often insisted on doing without overt personal protection, even
on overseas trips. Although contact between MI6 and the Royal Household
was officially only via the Foreign Office, I learnt while in MI6 that
there was unofficial direct contact between certain senior and influential
MI6 officers and senior members of the Royal Household. I did not see any
official papers on this subject, but I am confident that the information
is correct. I firmly believe that MI6 documents would yield substantial
leads on the nature of their links with the Royal Household, and would
yield vital information about MI6 surveillance on the Princess of Wales in
the days leading to her death. 
I also learnt while in MI6 that one of the "paparazzi" photographers who
routinely followed the Princess of Wales was a member of "UKN", a small
corps of part-time MI6 agents who provide miscellaneous services to MI6
such as surveillance and photography expertise. I do not know the identity
of this photographer, or whether he was one of the photographers present
at the time of the fatal incident. However, I am confident that
examination of UKN records would yield the identity of this photographer,
and would enable the inquest to eliminate or further investigate that
potential line of enquiry. 
On Friday August 28 1998, I gave much of this information to Judge Herv
Stephan, the French investigative Judge in charge of the inquest into the
accident. The lengths which MI6, the CIA and the DST have taken to deter
me giving this evidence and subsequently to stop me talking about it,
suggests that they have something to hide. 
On Friday 31 July 1998, shortly before my appointment with Judge Herv
Stephan, the DST arrested me in my Paris hotel room. Although I have no
record of violent conduct I was arrested with such ferocity and at
gunpoint that I received a broken rib. I was taken to the headquarters of
the DST, and interrogated for 38 hours. Despite my repeated requests, I
was never given any justification for the arrest and was not shown the
arrest warrant. Even though I was released without charge, the DST
confiscated from me my laptop computer and Psion organiser. They illegally
gave these to MI6 who took them back to the UK. They were not returned for
six months, which is illegal and caused me great inconvenience and
financial cost. 
On Friday 7th August 1998 I boarded a Qantas flight at Auckland
International airport, New Zealand, for a flight to Sydney, Australia
where I was due to give a television interview to the Australian Channel
Nine television company. I was in my seat, awaiting take off, when an
official boarded the plane and told me to get off. At the airbridge, he
told me that the airline had received a fax "from Canberra" saying that
there was a problem with my travel papers. I immediately asked to see the
fax, but I was told that "it was not possible". I believe that this is
because it didn't exist. This action was a ploy to keep me in New Zealand
so that the New Zealand police could take further action against me. I had
been back in my Auckland hotel room for about half an hour when the New
Zealand police and NZSIS, the New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service,
raided me. After being detained and searched for about three hours, they
eventually confiscated from me all my remaining computer equipment that
the French DST had not succeeded in taking from me. Again, I didn't get
some of these items back until six months later. 
Moreover, shortly after I had given this evidence to Judge Stephan, I was
invited to talk about this evidence in a live television interview on
Americas NBC television channel. I flew from Geneva to JFK airport on
Sunday 30 August to give the interview in New York on the following Monday
morning. Shortly after arrival at John F Kennedy airport, the captain of
the Swiss Air flight told all passengers to return to their seats. Four US
Immigration authority officers entered the plane, came straight to my
seat, asked for my passport as identity, and then frogmarched me off the
plane. I was taken to the immigration detention centre, photographed,
fingerprinted, manacled by my ankle to a chair for seven hours, served
with deportation papers (exhibit 1) and then returned on the next
available plane to Geneva. I was not allowed to make any telephone calls
to the representatives of NBC awaiting me in the airport. The US
Immigration Officers - who were all openly sympathetic to my situation and
apologised for treating me so badly - openly admitted that they were
acting under instructions from the CIA. 
In January of this year, I booked a chalet in the village of Samoens in
the French Alps for a ten day snowboarding holiday with my parents. I
picked up my parents from Geneva airport in a hire car on the evening of
January 8, and set off for the French border. At the French customs post,
our car was stopped and I was detained. Four officers from the DST held me
for four hours. At the end of this interview, I was served with the
deportation papers below (exhibit 2), and ordered to return to
Switzerland. Note that in the papers, my supposed destination has been
changed from "Chamonix" to "Samoens". This is because when first
questioned by a junior DST officer, I told him that my destination was
"Chamonix". When a senior officer arrived an hour or so later, he crossed
out the word and changed it to "Samoens", without ever even asking or
confirming this with me. I believe this is because MI6 had told them of my
true destination, having learnt the information through surveillance on my
parent's telephone in the UK. My banning from France is entirely illegal
under European law. I have a British passport and am entitled to travel
freely within the European Union. MI6 have "done a deal" with the DST to
have me banned, and have not used any recognised legal mechanism to deny
my rights to freedom of travel. I believe that the DST and MI6 have banned
me from France because they wanted to prevent me from giving further
evidence to Judge Stephans inquest, which at the time, I was planning to
Whatever MI6s role in the events leading to the death of the Princess of
Wales, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul, I am absolutely certain that there is
substantial evidence in their files that would provide crucial evidence in
establishing the exact causes of this tragedy. I believe that they have
gone to considerable lengths to obstruct the course of justice by
interfering with my freedom of speech and travel, and this in my view
confirms my belief that they have something to hide. I believe that the
protection given to MI6 files under the Official Secrets Act should be set
aside in the public interest in uncovering once and for all the truth
behind these dramatic and historically momentous events. 


SWORN at ) 

this day of ) 

1998, before me:- ) 


A Notary Public 

EXHIBIT 1 [none provided with file]  

EXHIBIT 2 [none provided with file] 

For More Information Contact:

Richard Tomlinson